One of the most persistent mysteries in the history of humankind is the collapse of ancient societies. It is puzzling that societies reaching such high levels of development disappeared so suddenly. It has been argued that overexploitation of environmental resources has played a role in causing the collapse of such societies. In this paper we propose an explanation for the pattern that overexploitation seems more common in ancient societies that built larger structures. This explanation is based on the well-studied sunk-cost effect in human decision making: Decisions are often based on past investments rather than expected future returns.
"The most important thing we can learn from the past is that no earlier civilization has survived. And the larger the pyramids and temples and statues they build in honour of their god or themselves, the harder was the fall." Thor Heyerdahl (1998, pp.292-293) .
Introduction
The impressive temples and pyramids of ancient times are symbols of mighty societies. How is it possible that such highly-developed societies have disappeared? One of possible explanations is that the environmental resource base of these societies was depleted (Tainter, 1988; Yoffee and Cowgill, 1988; Ponting, 1991; Diamond, 1997 Diamond, , 2001 ). The societies of the Mayas, Mesopotamians, and Polynesians are famous examples of collapses related to resource depletion (Tainter, 1988; Ponting, 1991) . Mesopotamia , lying in the river basins of the Tigris and the Euphrates, was able to build up a complex society due to intensive agriculture and excessive irrigation. However, irrigation practices led to a rise of saline groundwater and destroyed agricultur al productivity. In a similar ve in, intensive agricultural practices led to soil erosion and decreasing agricultural productivity. The Polynesians who invaded Easter Island developed a complex society during the 1000 years after their arrival but consumed all natural resources to sustain the increasing population and ritual activities, and collapsed before the Europeans arrived in 1722. Tainter (1988) defines collapse as when a society "displays a rapid, significant loss of an established level of socio-political complexity" (Tainter, 1988, p. 4) . The use of the term collapse in archeology is more subtle. Some argue that we have to talk about transformations or just abandonment of settlements. In this paper we might sometimes be less subtle in using the word collapse compared to our colleagues in archeology. Many explanations have been proposed for collapses of ancient societies, varying from depletion of vital resources to invasions of barbarians and catastrophes (earthquakes, climate shifts, and floodings). Tainter proposed an economic explanation of collapse. During development, socie ties increase in complexity, that is, comprised of more parts, more kinds of parts, and greater integration of parts. At a certain level of complexity, the costs of increasing complexity surpass the benefits, leading to a collapse (Tainter, 1988) .
In this paper , the concept of Tainter is extended with insights from human decision making. The question is why ancient societies invested beyond the optimal level of complexity, leading to overharvesting of their renewable resources. Our explanation for over harvesting is based on the sunk-cost effect. This effect points to the observation that human decision making is influenced by the level of prior investments. Besides capital investments, experience and spiritual values (land of ancestors) might be included. According to conventional economic theory, one should only include incremental costs and benefits of the current options in one's decision making. However, there are numerous examples of animal and human behavior that have shown that humans do attend to prior investment as they consider what course of action to take.
An illustrative example is the Greenland Norse , 1 who might have survived if they had adopted a maritime hunting lifestyle like the Greenland Inuit, but who had a big investment in inner-fjord pastures to support oversized stone churches and a cathedral which they were unwilling to abandon, probably because of a sunk-cost effect (Pringle, 1997) .
The inclusion of sunk costs for the study of managing renewable resources is not new.
Earlier studies focused on fisheries (Clark et al., 1979) and rubber and aluminium industries (Barham et al., 1998) . Sunk costs appear when capital cannot be sold in times of a declining capital stock, which affects strategic investment behavior. Empirical examples show that sunk costs can lead to a hysteresis, that is, a lag into recover y from a recess ion. However, the previous sunk-cost studies explained observed overcapacities, while in this study the sunk-1 We thank Jared Diamond for providing the example on the Greenland Norse.
cost effect is used to explain the overharvesting of the resource. Notice that the sunk-cost effect includes , in addition to financial sunk costs, psychological factors to explain decision making.
We will show that accumulation of investments reduce the flexibility of decision making. The sunk-cost effect will keep societies continuing their business-as-usual in periods of stress instead of structurally changing their activities or moving to new places with better opportunities. This leads to a collapse of the system which is illustrated by a stylized model.
Model exercises are performed to investigate under which circumstances the sunk-cost effect becomes significant. This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the economic -based framework of collapse of ancient societies of Tainter, which we relate t o the ecological concept of resilience. The sunk-cost effect is discussed in section 3. In section 4, we will illustrate that the sunk-cost effect hypothesis relates to observations in archeology. A bioeconomic model is introduced in section 5 and is analyzed in section 6. Section 7 discusses the implications of the derived insights for current management of ecological economic systems.
Complexity, Resilience , and the Collapse of Societies
Tainter (1988) argued that there is an underlying process within societies that explains the subsequent collapse. When societies grow, their complexity increases. Beyond a certain level, further increase of complexity has negative marginal returns, and the society becomes vulnerable to collapse.
It is important to note here the role of technology. Brunk (2002) argues that "societies always tend to evolve toward the maximum level of complexity that is possible given current technological constraints" Brunk (2002, p. 219) . This explains why current societies reach higher levels of complexity than the Romans and the Mayas. We are more efficient to exploit resources to increase complexity.
Tainter relates complexity to the size of a society, the number and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of specialized social roles that it incorporates, the number of distinct social personalities present, and the variety of mechanisms for organizing these into a coherent, functioning whole (Tainter, 1988) . With respect to the history of humanity, it is only very recently that complex societies emerged. For most of our history we lived as low -density foragers, and there is no simple explanation for the increased complexity. Tainter argues that the development of complexity is an economic process. Complexity levies costs and yields benefits. There are diminishing returns to the degree of complexity, and in some cases even negative returns. For example, simple inexpensive solutions are adopted before moving to the more complex and expensive ones , meaning that investments in societies invest may become more complex over time. Societies initially benefit from increasing complexity because the initial strategies work and give high returns per unit of investment (Tainter, 2000) . For a period, increasing complexity can continue to generate positive feedbacks. The successful efforts of our ancestors to provide food for an increasing population led to more intensive agricultural practices as well as a continuation of population growth. Unfortunately, no society can continue to increase complexity and maintain stable or increasing returns forever.
As society increases in complexity, the investments in resource extraction, administration, organization, and defense increase. In the beginning, increase of complexity is favorable, but there is a decreasing rate of return. This will make the society liable to collapse, since diminishing returns make complexity less attractive and breed disaffection. Taxes a nd other costs rise to maintain the complexity, while benefits do not rise at the same rate. Finally, the society will reach a point , given technological constraints, beyond which the increase in complexity leads to negative returns (Tainter, 1988) .
Why does a society become vulnerable to disturbances at higher levels of complexity?
A possible explanation can be found in the concept of resilience. This concept originates from the notion that ecosystems are able to absorb a certain amount of disturbance before the system structurally changes (Holling, 1973) . Systems can depart from an equilibrium steady state but remain within a so-called stability domain. In a stability domain, the system is organized into a set of mutually reinforcing structures and processes. If sufficiently large and/or sufficiently durable, disturbances can cause a system to flip into another stability domain (Scheffer et al., 2001 ).
The resilience concept explains why, at an increasing level of complexity, ancient societies became vulnerable to disturbances such as droughts (Hodell et al., 1995; Hodell et al., 2001; Weiss and Bradley, 2001 ) and earthquakes (Nur and Cline, 2000) . During the growth phase of a society, a large amount of capital, including infrastructure, organizational structures and knowledge, is built up, and complexity increases. This complexity reduces short-term variability within the system. For example, the transition from a hunter-gatherer society to an agricultural society provided a certain stable food supply. However, certain agricultural practices reduced the resilience of the system, since they influenced s low processes of nature in a negative way. For example, the irrigation practices in Mesopotamia provided food supply for an increasing population until the slow process of salinization became dominant. Figure 1 illustrates the effect of disturbances. We ca n consider the resource isocline as an equilibrium curve with a catastrophe fold. Stochastic events that reduce the resource abundance (pests, fires, droughts) may have little effect in small settlements (upper left on R'=0) but can bring the system across the border of the attraction basin of the over -exploited state in large settlements (arrow) resulting in a crash. If sunk-cost effects cause people to leave only at low resource levels, the settlement will grow until point F2 is reached and the resource crashes, followed by abandonment of the settlement. The resources may recover eventually and a new settlement may be set up, resulting in a cyclic development.
[ Figure 1 ]
Tainter (2000) argues that increase of complexity is necessary to continue providing solutions for increasing population pressure. However, this explanation is not satisfactory.
When population pressure is high and increasing complexity is at negative marginal returns, it might become economically rational to reduce population pressure, for example by migration.
The question now is why ancient societies increased their complexity and population size until they collapsed. A possible explanation is given in the following section by empirical evidence from animal and human behavior.
Empirical Evidence from Studies on Sunk -Cost Effects
Economic theory tells us that prior investment should not influence one's consideration of current options. Only the incremental costs and benefits of the current options should influence one's decision. How ever, there are numerous examples of animal and human behavior that shown that animals and humans do attend to prior investment as they consider what course of action to take. With regard to human behavior this is called the sunk-cost effect (e.g., Arkes a nd Ayton, 1999). The Concorde fallacy, explained below, is a similar effect but restricted to lower animals (e.g. , Dawkins and Carlisle, 1976) . This section reviews the literature on these phenomena.
The dim financial prospects of the Concorde were known long before the plane was completed, but the United Kingdom and France decided to continue anyway on the grounds that they had already invested a lot of money. 2 The term "Concorde fallacy" has been used to refer to lower animal behavior in relation to parental investments. Trivers (1972) defined parental investment as "any investment by the parent in an individual offspring that increases the offspring's chance of surviving (and hence reproductive success) at the cost of the parent's ability to invest in other offspring" (p. 139). Typical exa mples are the defense of a nest and the feeding of the young. According to Trivers (1972) , male partners in most species are more likely than female partners to desert the partner and the developing young because, in gene ral, the male partner has invested very little compared with the female partner. Dawkins and Carlisle (1976) argue that Trivers's reasoning is fallacious. For example, they suggest an alternative reason why an older offspring is preferred. Of two offspring of different ages, the older is preferred not because of the magnitude of the prior investment, but because the expected magnitude of investment in the future is smaller for the older offspring. Thus, consideration of the incremental costs and benefits, not of sunk costs, explains the parental investment decisions. Many studies have been performed during the last 20 years to test the Concorde fallacy for lower animals. The studies support evidence for both explanations. In a review of many studies, Arkes a nd Ayton (1999) conclude that the Concorde fallacy does not hold for lower animals. Lower animals presumably do not actually perform a cost -benefit analysis, but evolutionary pressure , ensure that offspring whose behavior leads to a balance of costs and be nefits have a higher fitness.
Although lower animals seem not to commit the Concorde fallacy, ma ny studies demonstrate the sunk-cost effect for humans (Arkes and Ayton, 1999) . For example, Staw and Hoang (1995) studied the performance of basketball player s in the NBA. Individuals who were higher draft picks were given greater playing time independent of the player's performance. Because higher draft picks cost the team more money, both their greater playing time and their enhanced career longe vity are examples of the influence of high sunk costs. Camerer and Weber (1999) There is an interesting difference in test results between adults and children with regard to the sunk-cost effect. Children below 10 years of age seem to be less susceptible to the sunk-cost effect than humans of older ages. Arkes and Ayton (1999) explain this by the fact that young humans have more modest cognitive abilities. These cognitive abilities are suggested to be the main explanation for sunk-cost effects, since humans, especially adults, tend to define complex strategies. Such strategies can be highly advantageous in some situations, but they can be a detriment if they are overgeneralized to situations in which those strategies are no longer appropriate. Humans are able to define abstract rules and apply them to new situations.
One rule that can explain the sunk-cost effect is "Don't waste" (Arkes, 1996) . This means to avoid abandoning a (failing) course of action in which resources are already
invested. An example is the lost-ticket scenario in which participants are asked whether they would still pay $10 for a ticket for the theat er when they (1) discover that they lost a $10 bill or (2) discover that they lost the ticket. If one has already bought a ticket, the participant is much less likely to spend another $10 for another ticket (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981 ). An explanation is that in case (1) the $10 lost was not assigned to the ticket, while in case (2) they had already spent $10 on a ticket and would experience a total price of $20 for the theater ticket.
Escalation of commitment occurs when people or organizations who have committed resourses to a project are inclined to 'throw good money after bad' and maintain or increase their commitment to the project, even when its marginal costs exceed marginal benefits (Teger, 1980; Camerer and Weber, 1999) . Escalation of commitment is very similar to the sunk-cost fallacy. Most research is focused on individual decision making. The main explanation of observed escalation is self-justification (Brockner, 1992) . The idea of selfjustification is that people do not like to admit that their past decisions were incorrect, and therefore are trying to reaffirm the correctness of those earlier decisions.
One may expect that irrational behavior might be corrected in groups. However, from the literature it is known that groups make riskier decisions than the mean of decisio ns made by individuals; furthermore, escalation of commitment is also found in group decision making, although a different explanation is given (Bazerman et al., 1984) . Members of a group strive for unanimit y. A typical goal for political decisions within small-scale societies is to reach consensus (Boehm, 1996) . Once unanimity is reached, the easiest way to protect it is to stay committed to the group's decision (Bazerman et al., 1984; Janis, 1972) . Thus , when the group is faced with a negative feedback, membe rs will not suggest abandonment of the earlier course of action, since this might break the existing unanimity.
From the literature on Concorde fallacies, sunk-cost effects, and escalation of commitments we can conclude that humans, es pecially adults, show investment behavior that can be denoted as sunk-cost effects. In the following sections we use this effect to explain overshoot and collapse behavior of ancient societies. The underlying hypothesis is that when a society is totally flexible in its actions, the potential for collapse is reduced. In case of total flexibility, people will move to other places when the society is confronted with real scarcit y of resources. Due to the sunk-cost effect, they hesitate because they would lose what they had built up in terms of knowledge, social networks, and physical and symbolic capital. People cannot leave without experiencing the costs of losing prior investments. Theref ore, they will stay longer, stimulating a collapse of the society as a w hole. This may explain why societies increase their complexity above the optimal level.
However, note that sunk costs may also provide benefits. If people do not develop any sunk costs, they may use resources according to the tragedy of the commons-they enter a region, harvest the resource, and leave. Building up sunk costs provides them the opportunity to learn from the system and to develop effective institutions to regulate the management of the resource. Nevertheless, sunk cost may become too large, a nd people stay longer than they should from a rational perspective. We only address the latter case, and do not include the development of institutions in our analysis.
Sunk-cost Effects and Archeological Evidence
In this section, we discuss some examples that illustrate possible evidence of the sunk-cost effect in archeological data. The most prominent example is of the prehispanic Pueblo (Anasazi) who constructed some of the largest non-earthen structures built in the USA before the Chicago skyscrape rs of the 1880s (e.g., Pueblo Bonito, Chaco Canyon, New Mexico). In the U.S. Southwest, the Anasazi built simple , small villages, but also large settlements which frequently show evidence of large and labor-costly multi-walled structures, lacking at small sites. The case is especially suitable for testing for sunk-cost effects, because tree-ring analysis of wood remains and high-resolution dating of construction activity in the small and the large settlements can provide us with estimates of potential annual agr icultural production.
In Janssen et al. (2002) we have analyzed data from different settlements and found as the sunk-cost hypothesis predicts, that people will continue to invest in construction at large settlements even in periods of scarcity, whereas constructio n at small settlements was confined to periods of relative abundance.
Redman (1999) discusses another illustrative example of ancient villa ges in southern
Jordan. Trees around the villages were cut down for home construction and plaster bur ning, making room for agricultural fields with goats as the primary domestic animals. In the shortterm, goats must have seemed like the perfect complement to agricultural fields, manuring them and consuming the seemingly useless stubble of the fields in the off-season. But goats are browsers and would have had a serious effect on seedlings and young saplings , thereby retarding the regeneration of forest cover during the growing season when they could not graze in agricultural fields. The ever-present need for fuel wood and the grazing of goats put pressure on vegetative ground cover over a wider and wider area. As the fuel and grazing needs pushed the boundary of native vegetation further and further from the villages, less timber was available for home construction and wild resources became less attractive , resulting in the villagers' narrowing their food sources by relying more and more on domestic fields and herds.
The villagers presumably invented ways to adapt to the negative aspects of the developing agricultural system, thereby masking the land degradation. But , in the longer term, they became more vulnerable due to loss of resilience in their productive base, and it is likely that a slight change in climate led to a series of dry years that were too much for the agricultural villages to absorb, leading to abandonment (Redman, 1999) .
Tainter (2000) mentions an example where a society recovered from a series of crises by deliberately simplifying its complexity, which in the case of the Byzantines can be interpreted as a deliberate reduction of sunk costs. During the crises of the seventh century the Byzantines lost half their empire, and the rulers of the empire became aware that the y could not continue business as usual. The simplification of the complex society was implemented by removing the structure of ranks and honors, simplifying the civil administration, reducing governmental transaction costs, and cutting the costs of its army. The last decision was based on a rather crucial change of incentives: By making soldiers landowners and producers, they fought better than before-for their own properties-and the empire started losing land.
One might get the impression that we argue that aggregation of people leads automatically to a collapse. However, there are many obvious benefits of aggregation. In fact, many archeologists study the formation of states and other hierarchical systems. But for the sake of analytical transparency we will discuss here solely the effects of sunk costs on a stylized model of ancient societies.
A Minimal Bioeconomic Model of Ancient Societies
A stylized model of the long-term development of societies is presented. Three modules are distinguished: the ecological resource, the population dynamics, and the human activities. The model builds on the recent line of work in economic literature on ancient societies , such as the study of Easter Island by Brander and Taylor (1998) , Reuveny and Decker (2000) , Dalton and Coats (2000) and Anderies (2000) , and the study on the competition between Homo sapiens and the Neanderthals by Faria (2000) . Those models have in common that they include renewable resources by a standard logistic function, which together with a simple model of human activities lead to a bioeconomic model. The model s are studied by analyzing the multiple equilibria and simulation.
In line with this tradition, a stylized model will be defined which includes the basic elements of ancient societies describing the interactions between resource, population, and sunk costs in order to understand in which conditions the society collapses. We describe a very simplistic and abstract situation without the intention to reproduce the dynamics of a specific society.
The renewable resource R is defined as the resource relative to its carrying capacity, and is formulated as a standard logistic model of which a certain amount is harvested.
with the intrinsic growth rate g R and the harvest of the resource by human activities, which depends on the consumption level per capita c (mass/person) and the population size H (persons).
Natural growth and migration determine the population of the society. First we will discuss the population equation without migration. Like Anderies (2000) , we distinguish be tween a constant background change rate µ H and a change rate depending linearly on per capita resource consumption. This latter change rate is c·e, with e (person/mass) is the healthand culture-related parameter and denotes by how many persons per unit resource consumption the population will increase. Higher levels of resources per capita lead to higher life expectancies, better living conditions, and a higher net fertility rate (survivors one year after birth). The population equation is
Adding a migration rate µ m to the standard population model leads to 
The migration rate depends on the available natural resources per capita . This indicator denotes that a higher level of natural resources reduces the emigration rate (see equation (4)).
When there are no resources left, the total population will leave. Note that we do not explicitly include immigration, which may lead to an increase of the population when circumstances of other regions are worse than the region of interest. Because we do not yet include spatially explicit information, we omit possible inflow from surrounding regions. The parameter R o presents a threshold value of resources available per person below which more than 50% of the potential migration flow leaves the region. The parameter η determines the steepness of the reaction to leave or not when the available amount of resources reaches a certain level. The migration rate can now be written as
The threshold R o indicates when to leave, and the decision of how much to harvest from the resource, c, is determined by the decisions of the representative agent in the economic part of the model.
The economy of ancient societies is represented in a very simple way. The population allocate their time to the production and consumption of two goods, the bioresource goods (agricultural output and fish) and manufactured goods (tools, housing, and artistic output) (Brander and Taylor, 1998) .
A standard utility optimization U().
where m is the consumption per capita of manufactured goods, parameter γ represents the elasticity of consumption with respect to harvest of the renewable resource, p c and p m are the prices of bioresource and manufactured goods, and w is the wage rate. When the renewable resource is not restricting, optimization of time allocation leads to a fraction γ to spend on harvesting and a fraction (1-γ) to spend on manufacturing goods. In line with Anderies (2000) , we assume that the people need to have a minimum amount of bioresource goods c min to create a positive utility value. This leads to the following reformulated utility function:
Assuming a homogenous population of representative agents, we can describe consumption decisions at an individual level and translate them to the population level. In line with Brander and Taylor (1998), we assume linear produc tion functions.
where C is the bioresource harvest which is proportional to the product of the size of the resource and the amount of labor, L H , devoted to harvesting. The parameter α is a harvesting efficiency coefficient. Manufacturing output, M , is only related to labor inputs, L M :
By calculating the optimal allocation of time to maximize the utility function and by substitution we derive the actual per capita amount of bioresourse and manufactured goods (see Anderies (2000) for the derivation):
).
The harvest per capita depends on the amount of resources available and an efficiency parameter, α (1/(mass person)). The more abundant the resource, the more a person can harvest per unit of time. Since we assume that H = L C + L M , the amount of labor the population should devote to producing bioresource goods and manufactured goods is described as follows (see A nderies (2000) for a detailed derivation):
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that bioresource goods disappear after consumption, but that manufactured products are accumulated. The stock of manufactured products S increases with investments in manufacturing goods. The manufactured products have an average
The stock of manufactured products is assumed to be an indicator for sunk costs. The more time agents spend in producing manufactured products, the more they build up sunk costs. We assume that when sunk costs increase, the threshold R o when people migrate increases. Thus , accumulation of sunk costs delays migration. 
Model Experiments
The default values of the parameters of the stylized model are chosen as follows (Table 1) .
The default value for g R is assumed to be 0.04. The value of e is chosen to be 1, which leads to a variable change rate of c, while the constant change rate µ H is chosen to be 0.02. The In Figure 4 the fraction of the time the representative agent is harvesting is depicted against the average resource level per capita. The agent reduces the harvesting time gradually.
The resource grows faster than the population during the initial period, but at a certain population size, the resource per capita starts to decrease. When the resource per capita drops below 1, the fraction of the time spend on harvesting increases to meet the minimum consumption level.
[Figures 2, 3, and 4]
A more detailed analysis have been performed on the relation between the sunk-cost effect, the parameter ϕ , and the minimum level of resource consumption c min , which indicates a certain lifestyle. Figure 5 show s that the occurrence of stable cycles is stimulated by a larger degree of sunk-cost effect. Furthermore, the minimum consumption level needs to fit in a specific range. If c min is low, there is no scarcity and the population reaches a stable high level. I f c min is high, harvest is so intense that the resource is easily depleted and people leave before they have built up significant sunk cost. The intermediate levels generate enough sunk costs to produce the stable cycle. Figure 6 provides more information by depicting the maximum population size. It shows that the sunk-cost effect is especially important for modest levels of c min -between 0.01 and 0.04-and leads to a high maximum level of population.
The resulting minimum level of population after the crash indicates that this range is the most sensitive for overshoot and collapse (Figure 7 ).
[ Figure 5 , 6, and 7] In the evolution of civilizations, various parameters that are held constant can change.
Technological development improved efficiency (and lowered h min ), while economic development and changing lifestyles increased the minimum level of resource consumption.
Only a net reduction of resource consumption can reduce the risk of overshoot and collapse given the human nature of the sunk-cos t effect. We varied the parameters of the model to explore whether the qualitative results hold, and each time the results verified our insight that sunk-cost effect together with a modest level of desired consumption from the resource leads to collapse dynamics.
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed the sunk-cost effect as an important factor to explain overharvesting of resources by ancient societies, leading to their collapse. Historical examples, like that of Anasazi societies , confirm our hypot hesis, but a more rigorous analysis of the archeological record would be needed to test our hypothesis.
Besides providing an explanation of collapses of ancient societies, the sunk-cost effect can be used to analyze the current developments of ecological-economic systems. It should be clear that our current consumption pattern and population growth cannot be sustained forever.
Nevertheless, we try to find new solutions in increasing complexity, such as new technologies, and not in reducing the energy consum ption and population size. There are various psychological and economic reasons why our consumption pattern develo ps the way it does. The sunk-costs effect explains why people remain consuming resources which are already overharvested.
We want to remind the reader that we do not argue that ancient people failed not to behave like neoclassic models of man in modern economic textbooks. No, we argue that there is evidence that current people, and likely also in the past, do not behave like neoclassic models of man. The sunk-cost effect is an example of empirical evidence contrasting mainstream economic theory. But these insights from experimental social science might help us to explain certain puzzles, like the collapse of societies.
We included the sunk-cost effect in a standard ecological economic model and showed that the sunk-cost effect together with a modest level of desired consumption from the renewable resource generate collapse dynamics. There are a number of ways the mathematical model can be improved: (1) the inclusion of more realistic resource dynamics (fast and slow dynamics), (2) a spatial ly explicit version which will focus on settlement patterns in a landscape, and (3) the inclusion of heterogeneity among agents (different characteristics of households). The resulting model may explain under which conditions people can manage the resilience of regions properly by allocating the pressure on the system in a certain rhythm, and why some ancient societies did not succeed in this.
Since we are currently continuing to build sunk-costs on a global scale in our energyand material-intensive society in combination with human-induced changes of biogeochemical cycles, we reduce the resilience of present societies. New collapses of societies are to be expected, and as Thor Heyerdahl (1998) reminds us, this will not be exceptional, but a continuation of historical events. 
